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Abstract
Vacancy chains can be tracked in any context where a the availability
of a desirable resource triggers a cascade of occupations through which the
scarce resource flows through different owners. However, under certain con-
ditions vacancy chains, rather than markets or other forms of competition,
determine the allocation of the resource. This article develops a formal and
computational model of vacancy chains as a mechanism for resource alloca-
tion in order to find out their properties with respect to organizational forms.
We find that hierarchies with few middle managers are particularly prone
to make use of vacancy chains in order to allocate resources that originate
at the top, such as employment positions. In fact, vacancy chains often dis-
appear when information is widely available, because information is likely
to attract applicants who engage in a competition. Thus, the many middle
managers of a thick organization may compete for a resource that originates
at the top. On the contrary, organizations that are thick at the bottom and at
the top, but thin in the middle, are most likely to regulate resource allocation
by means of vacancy chains.
1 Introduction
Allocation of scarce resources may be achieved by means of monetary compro-
mises enabled by market interactions, by means of open fights, or by means of a
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combination of incomplete information and idiosyncratic needs engendered by
a particular organization. Both market interactions and open combats involve
competition. However, resource allocation does not require competition if only
one subject is able to fulfill certain requirements with respect to the knowledge
of those who assign the resource. Eventually, considerable efforts may be made
in order to be considered just a unique candidate. However, no competition, in
the sense in which two merchants compete on price or two warriors compete on
strength, takes place.
Consider for instance internal labor markets. Most of the times, promotion
of subordinates does not take place by posting available positions and hiring the
one who offers the longest working hours for the lowest wage. Most of the times,
managers observe subordinates long enough to know their abilities and eventually
offer a position to the one they deem is most able to do a particular job. In this par-
ticular example, substantial efforts may have been made by subordinates in order
to be deemed the only candidate able to cover that position. However, the position
was not allocated by means of an open competition between several candidates,
but simply because only one person with the required qualities was around when
the position became available.
Note also that in the above example a labor market does exist, in the sense that
the managers and the selected subordinate exchange work for wage. However, this
market did not govern the allocation of the scarce resource. The scarce resource
— the position — was allocated by focusing on a sufficiently narrow information
set — i.e. the employees of a particular section at a particular plant — and by
requiring sufficiently idiosyncratic competences. We shall see examples where
the same mechanism of resource allocation operates without any residual role for
the market.
It is important to realize that the above view of the labor market is opposite
to that of neoclassical economics. In fact, the latter assumes willful accumulation
of human capital in order to obtain certain positions. On the contrary, the above
view assumes that positions are available independently of the capabilities of ap-
plicants, and that a position is only assigned if it becomes vacant [12] [14] [8].
Since a vacant position is eventually occupied by someone who makes another
position available, chains of vacancies are triggered whenever an incumbent dies
or retires [25] [24]. Thus, the possibilities of employment for the youngest gen-
eration depend on the dynamics of previous generations, rather than on its own
capabilities.
However, since real organizations are characterized by a mixture of vacancy
chains and markets (or other allocative mechanisms based on competition), a va-
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cancy chain may stop to operate as a mechanism for resource allocation well be-
fore its end. Consider again the case of internal labor markets. A vacancy may
be triggered by a retirement, which triggers a chain of vacancies through subor-
dinates. At the beginning only one subordinate is available to replace the retired
employee, so the vacancy chain acts as a means for allocating the resource. How-
ever, by descending the hierarchy jobs may become less idiosyncratic, until two
or more equally qualified persons apply for the same position. From that point on-
wards, the resource is allocated by the labor market. However, the vacancy chain
can still be traced through employees of decreasing status, and eventually through
the external labor market as well.
Thus, the fact that a vacancy chain is identified does not imply that it is the
prime mover of resource allocation. Likewise, the fact that a monetary transaction
takes place does not imply that a resource is allocated by the market.
This distinction has never been explicitly stated in empirical research on va-
cancy chains. However, all empirical investigations have focused on situations
where vacancy chains, at least in their initial steps, did operate as allocation mech-
anisms. A closer examination of the empirical literature will shed light on this
issue:
• Internal labor markets have been mentioned as the prototypical example of
resource allocation by means of vacancy chains. For instance, an empiri-
cal study of a corporation operating in the forestry business highlighted that
although posting available positions to all employees was the company’s of-
ficial policy, two thirds of actual staffing decisions were made by means of
vacancy chains [11]. Indeed, theoretical considerations suggest that organi-
zations fill their lowest positions by means of labor markets, but openings
higher up in the hierarchy are assigned by means of vacancy chains [2].
The very first application of the concept of vacancy chains concerned the
occupancy of parish churches of increasing size [25] [24]. With hindsight
we may recognize that this field suits vacancy chains particularly well be-
cause ministers are appointed mainly depending on age, so no more than
one applicant is available for each position. For similar reasons, vacancy
chains apply to civil servants such as policemen [21] [20] [9] and doctors
[1]. An interesting instance is provided by highly specialized profession-
als whose competencies may be sufficiently unique to be hired by means
of vacancy chains. In cases of extreme specialization such as professional
football coaches, no two of them are equal so it makes no sense for them to
compete on a market [18] [19].
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• A housing market does exist, but houses and apartments of good quality are
very different from one another, so their value depends so much on personal
taste. Thus, prospective renters or owners do not base their decisions merely
on price. Rather, they generally wait until a house or apartment that satisfies
their aspirations becomes avalaible before leaving the one they are occupy-
ing. Also in this case, a scarce resource is allocated by means of vacancy
chains. On the contrary, low-quality apartments are likely to be allocated by
the market on the basis of price. The vacancy chain model has been success-
fully applied to the housing market [10] [7], though no effort has been made
to ascertain at what point the vacancy chains cease to operate as allocation
mechanism. However, it is interesting to remark that an economic model of
chains in the housing market had to assume idiosyncratic and discontinuous
preferences in order to reproduce empirical data [17]. Alternatively, one
could have assumed that information was so scarce that only one prospec-
tive buyer was available for each item in the higher segment of the market;
consequently, the vacancy chains would allocate the resources, rather than
the preferences of buyers.
• Hermit crabs use abandoned gastropod shells as shelters, which they carry
with them once they entered one. Crabs of increasing age need shells of
increasing size. Thus, an empty shell released in the environment triggers
a chain of vacancies of smaller shells. Experiments have been made where
one shell at a time was released in a pond where the density of crabs was
sufficiently low for there being only one crab in the proximity of a shell [5]
[4]. Thus, in this case the vacancy chain acts as a mechanism for resource
allocation. Note also that in this experiment no competition takes place, not
even for the selection of the prospective occupier. However, if two or more
hermit crabs are in the proximity of an empty shell which both of them like,
they fight for it [4]. In this case, albeit a vacancy chain can still be traced, it
does not operate as allocation mechanism. The combat does.
• Vacancy chains have been used for decentralized routing of robots [15] [16].
Since we can view robots as carriers or transporters that must be assigned to
alternative routes, this is also a problem of resource allocation. Interestingly,
in order for vacancy chains to work it was necessary to add a constraint that
impaired too many robots from servicing the same route at a time. Simi-
larly to employees aspiring to better jobs, families aspiring to better houses
and hermit crabs aspiring to better shells, some constraint must be there to
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ensure that only one candidate is ready to occupy a vacancy. If this is not
the case, some form of competition is in order to resolve the question, be
it market competition or physical fight. In the case of robots, impairing
competition was simpler than endowing them with a criterium to establish
a winner.
Both empirical experiences and theoretical considerations have suggested con-
ditions for the existence of vacancy chains. According to Chase, vacancy chains
require that i) The resource units are reusable, discrete, identifiable and utilized
by one individual or social group at a time; ii) A unit must be vacant before it can
be taken by a new occupant; iii) Individuals must need or want new and usually
“bigger” or “better” units; iv) Vacant units must be scarce; v) Most individuals in
a group already must have units so they can leave one behind when they move to
a new one [3]. According to Sørensen, vacancy chains require that a) The pre-
determined and well specified nature of positions; b) The indefinite duration of
matches between people and positions; c) Allocations that represent the outcomes
of authority decisions rather than market exchanges [13].
While not contradictory to one another, only the condition (c) among the eight
listed above cares that vacancy chains allocate resources rather than just tracking
the allocation of resources made by the market. The formulation adopted in this
paper is more general, for it does not require that allocations “represent the out-
comes of authority decisions” but simply that only one candidate is there for a
certain role, as it happened in the experiments with hermit crabs. Furthermore,
the alternatives to vacancy chains considered in this paper include all means of
allocating scarce resources based on competition, including the market but not
limiting to it.
Once it is recognized that vacancy chains may act as a means for the allocation
of scarce resources if information is sufficiently restrained, one may ask which
organizational structures, whose members are characterized by different informa-
tion sets, are most conducive of vacancy chains. Section 2 illustrates a model of
vacancy chains in organizational structures. Section 3 explores its properties and
identifies one particular structure where vacancy chains are particularly likely to
be used as a resource allocation mechanism. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Vacancy Chains in Organizational Structures
Vacancy chains are generally modeled by means of Markov chains [25] [24]. In
this section, a particular model is presented in order to study the propagation of
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vacancy chains in organizational structures.
Let us consider a set of positions arranged in strata, which may represent
hierarchical levels in an organization, or degrees of quality of houses, or size
of shells, or path lengths in a routing problem, or else. Strata are ordered by
decreasing importance, top to bottom of a hierarchy. It is a partial ordering, i.e.
two or more agents may belong to the same stratum.
Let pi j denote the probability that a vacancy in stratum i moves to stratum j,
with i, j = 0,1,2, . . .s where s is the number of strata over the zero level. In par-
ticular, since stratum 0 represents the outer world, the probability that a vacancy
moves from stratum i to the outside is pi0.
Let us arrange probabilities pi j in a (s+1)× (s+1) matrix P. Let us assume
that hierarchical ladders are climbed one step at a time, which implies that va-
cancies can only move one stratum lower at each step. Thus, P has the following
form:
P =


1 0 · · · 0
p10 p11 0 · · · 0
0 p21 p22 0 · · · 0
...
...
0 · · · 0 ps(s−1) pss


where the (0,0) element is 1 because vacancies cannot move once they reached
stratum 0.
Probabilities pi j are such that ∑ j pi j = 1. Since ∀i the only non-zero elements
are pi(i−1) and pii, and since pii = 1− pi(i−1), probabilities pi(i−1) are sufficient to
determine P.
By means of this matrix we want to investigate the length of vacancy chains
from their origin to the point where they cease to operate as a mechanism for
resource allocation, depending on starting stratum and organizational structure.
The length of our vacancy chains depends on:
• The origin of a vacancy chain. The higher the stratum where a vacancy first
occurs, the longer the ensuing chain can be (though the length of vacancy
chains depends on many factors). Let us denote by o, the origin of a vacancy
chain, with o ∈ N , 1 ≤ o ≤ s.
• The size of the neighborhood where the occurrence of a vacancy is known.
If two or more actors in the neighborhood qualify for the vacant position,
this is assigned by means of some form of competition. On the contrary, if
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only one actor in the neighborhood qualifies for the vacant position, this is
assigned to the only applicant. It is in this case that we say that the vacancy
chain operates as a mechanism for resource allocation. Let n denote the size
of the neighborhood, with n ∈ N .
• The number of strata, or hierarchical levels. Vacancy chains apply to any
organization whose positions are stratified; eventually, strata may represent
hierarchical levels if relations of subordination exist. Since we are only
interested in vacancy chains as long as they operate as devices to allocate
scarce resources, and since this can only happen if an organizational struc-
ture limits the diffusion of information (see above), we consider that va-
cancy chains do not propagate outside the organization. We have denoted
the number of strata by s, with s ∈ N . The outer world is represented by
s = 0.
• The distribution of positions on strata. If we are considering hierarchies,
the distribution of positions on strata tells the fraction of middle managers,
workers and top managers. In more general terms, a non-uniform distribu-
tion of positions on strata characterizes non-homogeneous structures. Let
us denote the distribution of positions by f (k), with k = 0,1,2, . . .s.
Let us first consider the case of a uniform distribution of strata. The number
of ways of arranging any number of (s + 1) different strata in n positions is the
number of dispositions with repetition of s+1 elements of class n, which is equal
to (s+1)n. This will be the denominator of the fraction that yields the pi(i−1)s.
The number of dispositions where a particular position is on a particular stra-
tum, all others being on any different stratum, is sn−1. The number of dispositions
where any position is on a particular stratum, all others being on any different
stratum, is nsn−1. Thus, the probability of finding exactly one position on the
required stratum in a neighborhood of size n is:
pi(i−1) =
nsn−1
(s+1)n
∀i (1)
Let us now consider the case of a non-uniform distribution of strata f (k). A
non-uniform distribution of strata implies that certain strata are overrepresented,
others are underrepresented. Instead of s, we should consider the integral of f (k).
On the numerator, this integral extends over the s strata obtained by excluding the
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Hierarchy Inverted Hierarchy Linear
Figure 1: Left to right, the structures obtained with a hierarchical, inverted hierar-
chical and linear distribution of positions, respectively.
i-th one. On the denominator, this integral extends over all s + 1 strata. Further-
more, the n at the numerator should be corrected by f (i− 1). In conclusion, we
obtain:
pi(i−1) =
n f (i−1) [∑i−1k=0 f (k)+∑sk=i+1 f (k)]n−1
[∑sk=0 f (k)]n
∀i (2)
which reduces to eq. 1 if f (k) = 1, ∀k.
Let us consider the matrix Ps. Its (i, j)-th element is the sum of the probabili-
ties of all chains that start at stratum o = i and end at stratum j in s moves.
Matrix Ps can be used to derive statistics about the length of vacancy chains.
For instance, ∀i > 0 the sum of the elements of Ps for j < i represents the prob-
ability that a chain starting at stratum i has a length greater than one. This is the
main indicator that will be observed in § 3.
3 Experimental Results
Let us investigate the properties of vacancy chains depending on their origin, the
size of the neighborhood where they are known, the number of strata, and the
distribution of positions on strata. Organizational structure, specified by the dis-
tribution of positions on strata, is our main concern. Figure 1 illustrates three basic
organizational structures: hierarchical, inverted hierarchical, and linear.
Several studies on vacancy chains [23] [22] focused on organizations with
less middle managers than purely pyramidal organizations, as in the left side of
figure 2. These structures are interesting because the perspectives of upward mo-
bility, represented by the derivative of their contour, are as illustrated in the right
side of figure 2. This shape suggests a “Venturi tube” effect, namely, that in these
organizations careers are most difficult at the middle levels.
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Hierarchy, mixed distribution The Venturi tube effect
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Figure 2: Left, the structures obtained with a mixed distribution of positions.
Right, the corresponding ratio of the number of positions in neighboring strata
and the ensuing Venturi tube effect.
Let us first explore hierarchical organizations (the leftmost part of figure 1)
with different number of strata, where vacancy chains originate at different levels
and are influenced by neighborhoods of different size. All results stem from the
numerical model illustrated in appendix A.
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of chain length in a hierarchical organiza-
tion with 5 strata, where vacancies originate at stratum 5 (the highest stratum),
for various sizes of the neighborhood. It is clear that larger neighborhoods pro-
duce longer vacancy chains, evidently because it is easier to find an agent who
is occupying a position exactly one stratum lower than the one where a vacancy
occurred.
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of chain length in a hierarchical organi-
zation with 5 strata, where vacancies originate at stratum 3, for various neigh-
borhood sizes. Here the picture is opposite to that of figure 3. In fact, larger
neighborhoods produce shorter chains. Evidently, at low hierarchical levels the
positions are so many that by increasing the neighborhood more than one agent
able to fill the vacancy and the chain stops.
The difference between figures 3 and 4 is interesting because it suggests that
for certain organizations and when vacancy chains originate at particular levels,
more information (a larger neighborhood) does not create markets or other forms
of competition. Rather, more information fosters resource allocation by means
of vacancy chains. However, for other organizations and starting strata it is just
the opposite. Thus, it is interesting to analyze which parameters originate dis-
tributions like in figure 3 as opposed to those that originate distributions like in
figure 4.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of hierarchical organizations for all possible
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Figure 3: Chain length distributions in a hierarchical organization with s = 5,
o = 5 and n = 4,8,24. All values have been averaged over 1,000 runs.
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Figure 4: Chain length distributions in a hierarchical organization with s = 5,
o = 3 and n = 4,8,24. All values have been averaged over 1,000 runs.
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combinations of the number of strata and the origin of vacancy chains. Vacancy
chains of length one are isolated vacancies. Thus, the proportion of vacancy chains
of length greater than one over total vacancy chains denotes the proportion of
vacancies that actually originate a chain before competitive allocation intervenes.
This will be called the proportion of vacancy chains henceforth.
Parameter combinations such that the proportion of vacancy chains increases
with neighborhood size (like in figure 3) have been denoted by an upward arrow.
Parameters combinations such that the proportion of vacancy chains decreases
with neighborhood size (like in figure 4) have been denoted by a downward arrow.
Finally, curve arrows denote combinations of parameters where the proportion
of chains increases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 4 to 8 but
decreases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 8 to 24.
Figure 5 highlights that there exists a region where vacancy chains are facili-
tated by more information (larger neighborhood), separated from a region where
vacancy chains are impaired by more information (larger neighborhood). The area
between these two regions is rather thin, and almost horizontal. Thus, the effect
of information on the proportion of vacancy chains does not depend on the num-
ber of strata. On the contrary, the origin of the vacancy chain is crucial. Only
vacancy chains originating sufficiently high in the hierarchy are favored by more
information.
Let us consider inverted hierarchies, i.e. organizations where there are far
more high-ranked positions than low-ranked ones. This is the case illustrated in
the center of figure 1. All else remains as above.
Figure 6 shows quite a different pattern from figure 5. Contrary to the previous
case, vacancy chains are impaired by more information if they originate close to
the top of the inverted hierarchy, whereas they are favored by more information if
they are sufficiently far from it. Furthermore, note that the separating region is not
horizontal. Thus, the effect of information on the proportion of vacancy chains
depends on both the number of strata and the stratum where the chain originates.
Let us consider the intermediate organizational structure considered in this
model, the linear organization. This is the case illustrated on the right of figure 1.
All else remains as above. Figure 7 illustrates the corresponding table.
This intermediate organizational form does not exhibit intermediate properties
between the hierarchy and the inverted hierarchy. Since it has the same number
of positions in any stratum, the stratum where vacancies originate does not affect
the outcome.
In both the hierarchy and the inverted hierarchy, larger neighborhoods have a
positive impact on the proportion of vacancy chains when contiguous strata have
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Figure 5: Hierarchy, variation of the proportion of vacancy chains with increasing
neighborhood size (s: number of strata; o: stratum where vacancy chains origi-
nate). Upward arrows denote parameters combinations such that the proportion of
vacancy chains increases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 4 to 8 to
24. Downward arrows denote parameters combinations such that the proportion
of vacancy chains decreases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 4 to
8 to 24. Finally, curve arrows denote parameters combinations such that the pro-
portion of vacancy chains first increases when the size of the neighborhood passes
from 4 to 8, then decreases when the size of the neighborhood passes from 8 to
24. Undirected bars denote parameter sets that produced outcomes differing from
one another by less than 1%. All results have been averaged over 1,000 runs.
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Figure 6: Inverted hierarchy, variation of the proportion of vacancy chains with
increasing neighborhood size (s: number of strata; o: stratum where vacancy
chains originate). All else as in figure 5.
4 81 2 3 5 6 7 9 10
1
5
4
3
2
6
7
8
9
10
o
s
Figure 7: Linear organization, variation of the proportion of vacancy chains with
increasing neighborhood size (s: number of strata; o: stratum where vacancy
chains originate). All else as in figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 8: Organizations giving rise to a Venturi tube in upward mobility, variation
of the proportion of vacancy chains with increasing neighborhood size (s: number
of strata; o: stratum where vacancy chains originate). Since this organization
requires at least four hierarchical levels in order to be implemented, the first three
columns are blank. All else as in figures 5, 6 and 7.
a very different number of positions (at the top of a hierarchy, at the bottom of
an inverted hierarchy). In the linear organization, any two strata have the same
number of positions. Thus, larger neighborhoods — i.e. more information —
never has a positive impact on the proportion of vacancy chains. The impact is
generally negative or, if there are sufficiently many strata first positive and then
negative. These are the curve arrows on the right of figure 7.
Finally, let us consider organizations with less middle managers than purely
pyramidal organizations (see figure 2). Figure 8 shows that this organizational
form is such that in any case a small increase of information always favors the
allocation of resources by means of vacancy chains (curve arrows). Furthermore,
most of the times even a large increase of information favors the allocation of
resources by means of vacancy chains (upward arrows). Thus, organizations with
shapes as in figure 2 are likely to make a frequent use of vacancy chains in order
to allocate resources.
Note that a common feature of figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 is that all curve arrows
first go up and then turn down, no one does the opposite. In other words, it never
happens that by slightly increasing the size of the neighborhood the chains of va-
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cancies become shorter and by increasing it further they become longer. It is so
because larger neighborhoods may allow longer chains to the extent that they pro-
vide more actors able to fill a vacancy, and this effect is most prominent when
the neighborhood is still small and does not include one instance of each stra-
tum. Conversely, larger neighborhoods may force chains to be short to the extent
that they include several instances in the same stratum, and this effect becomes
prominent when the neighborhood becomes very large.
4 Conclusions
The numerical results of this paper highlighted that organizations have a large
influence on the ability of vacancy chains to act as a device for allocating scarce
resources. In particular, hierarchical organizational forms with fewer middle man-
agers than straight pyramids are most likely to be regulated by vacancy chains.
Considering that since decades most organizations tend to reduce the size of mid-
dle management, this finding makes vacancy chains a very relevant issue.
Also, compare this result with the conclusions of neoclassical economic the-
ory and its variations. According to this theory, the more information is available,
the better the markets work. Eventually, markets fail because information is asym-
metric or incomplete. According to the economics of information, if information
asymmetries would be removed from the labor market, from the loan market or
from the “market for lemons”, then prices would suffice to allocate resources op-
timally.
Economic theory reaches this result because it is based on structureless mar-
kets. On the contrary, we have found that within certain organizational forms
more information cause the market to be superseded by vacancy chains. Since
these organizational forms are quite common, the finding that information may
limit the power of markets should not be taken as a curiosum.
A The Computational Model
A computational model is built on the NetLogo platform. 1 Its purpose is to inves-
tigate the properties of the equations expounded in § 2.
1The code is available at <http:// ccl.northwestern.edu/ netlogo> under the rubric Community
Models.
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The world is a torus, depicted as a square. On the square, a grid identifies
positions. Trials have shown that the number of positions (the size of the square)
does not influence the results.
Each position on the square belongs to a stratum. Strata are ordered by de-
creasing importance, e.g., high to low positions in a hierarchy, shells or apart-
ments of decreasing size, or else. White positions rank highest, followed by grays
of increasing darkness.
It is a partial ordering, i.e., two or more agents may belong to the same stratum.
Strata may represent hierarchical levels in an organization, or degrees of quality
of houses, or size of shells, or path lengths in a routing problem, or else.
The model is initialized by producing vacancies at all positions belonging to
a particular stratum. Subsequently, vacancies propagate to the lower strata. Trials
have shown that if vacancies produce only on a portion of the positions belonging
to a particular stratum, results do not change.
At each step, an actor is eligible for a vacancy if it is close enough to it and if
it belongs to a stratum that is just one grade lower. If there is only one such actor,
occupation of the vacancy is made by private agreement so the vacancy chain acts
as an allocation mechanism. The actor moves up, a new vacancy is produced and
the chain proceeds. If, on the contrary, several actors are able to fill the vacancy,
the resource must be allocated competitively. At this point, chains are truncated.
The number of strata can be selected by means of the slider n-of-strata,
which takes values between 1 and 10. If the number of strata is 1, then vacancy
chains take place in an organization that is perfectly flat. Thus, the model area
will entail positions of only two colors: white positions inside the organization,
and black positions outside the organization. If the number of hierarchical levels
is 2, the model area will entail positions of three colors: white positions for the
managers, grey positions for their subordinates, and black positions outside the
organization. And so on, obviously.
The distribution of positions on strata can be assigned as follows (see § B):
1. A decreasing exponential distribution from low to high strata, if the param-
eter strata-distribution is set to 1. The functional form is f (k) = e−αk,
α ∈ R , where s ∈ N is the number of strata and k = 0,1,2 . . .s. This dis-
tribution corresponds to the familiar experience of a hierarchy with far less
managerial positions than subordinate positions. With respect to a pyrami-
dal structure, a decreasing exponential describes a hierarchy where the ratio
of the number of positions in neighboring strata is lower in lower strata than
in upper strata. Thus, career advancements are most difficult at the bottom
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of the hierarchy. This representation is consistent with classical accounts of
the span of control [6] as well as with mathematical applications of vacancy
chains to organizations [12].
2. A decreasing exponential distribution from high to low strata, if the pa-
rameter strata-distribution is set to 2. The functional form is f (k) =
e−α(s−k), α ∈ R , where s ∈ N is the number of strata and k = 0,1,2 . . .s.
This distribution corresponds to an inverted hierarchy with many more man-
agers than subordinates. It is a clearly irrealistic organizational form, that
has been considered in order to evaluate the effect of an assumptions that is
opposite to the usual one.
3. A uniform distribution, if the parameter strata-distribution is set to 3.
The functional form is simply f (k) = 1 for k = 0,1,2 . . .s. This distribution
corresponds to an organization where there are just as many managers as
subordinates. The corresponding linear organization chart is not necessarily
a set of independent sequences of units, for the lines of command may still
cross one another. This organizational form is just as irrealistic as No. 2,
but also a midpoint between No. 1 and 2. It has been included in order
to evaluate the linearity of the properties of vacancy chains with respect to
organizational form.
4. Half the positions assigned to strata according to a decreasing exponential
distribution from low to high strata as in the above point (1), half the po-
sitions assigned to strata according to a poisson distribution from high to
low strata, if the parameter strata-distribution is set to 4. In this sec-
ond case the functional form is f (k) = e−αα(s− k)/(s− k)!, α ∈ R , where
s ∈ N is the number of strata and k = 0,1,2 . . .s. This mixed distribution
generates a hierarchy with proportionately less middle managers than a sim-
ple pyramid. This structure is such that upward movement is more difficult
for middle managers than for both top managers and low-level employees,
the so-called “Venturi tube” effect [23] [22].
Figure 1 illustrates the charts corresponding to the above distributions Nos. 1
(strata-distribution = 1), 2 (strata-distribution = 2) and 3 (strata-
-distribution = 3). Figure 2 illustrates the chart corresponding to the distri-
bution No. 4 (strata-distribution = 4), as well as the ratio of the number
of positions in neighboring strata. Details on the algorithms implementing these
distributions are explained in the appendix.
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Positions are placed in a space of acquaintances. This means that a vacancy
in a certain position is known to its neighbors but not to other agents in the orga-
nization. The button “neighborhood” can be either set to 4, 8 or 24 depending on
the number of neighbors each agent is supposed to be acquainted with. Vacancies
propagate if in the neighborhood of a vacancy on stratum i there is one and only
one position at stratum i−1.
In order to run the model, the following buttons should be pressed:
1. The Setup Positions button assigns each position on the model area to a
stratum, which is denoted by a shade of grey;
2. The Setup Vacancies button creates vacancies at all positions belonging
to the “starting stratum”, which become green;
3. The Go button makes the vacancies diffuse down the hierarchy, creating
yellow stripes.
B The Organizational Structures
The hierarchical organization has been modeled by means of a truncated expo-
nential distribution decreasing from low to high strata. Note that NetLogo does
not require to set the exponent but the mean:
set elevation n-of-strata + 1
while [elevation > n-of-strata]
[set elevation round random-exponential (1 + n-of-strata)/4]
The inverse hierarchical organization has been modeled by means of a trun-
cated exponential distribution decreasing from high to low strata:
set elevation -1
while [elevation < 0]
[set elevation n-of-strata - round random-exponential (1
+ n-of-strata)/4]
The linear organization has been modeled by means of a uniform distribution
of strata across positions:
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set elevation random (1 + n-of-strata)
Finally, the organization with few middle strata has been obtained by combin-
ing an exponential distribution decreasing from low to high strata with a poisson
distribution from high to low strata:
ifelse (random 2 = 0)
[
set elevation n-of-strata + 1
while [elevation > n-of-strata]
[set elevation round random-exponential (1 + n-of-strata)
/ 4]
]
[
set elevation -1
while [elevation < 0]
set elevation n-of-strata - round random-poisson (1 + n-of-strata)
/ 4]
]
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